Lecture 2003-03-17

"Wilsonian Idealism and Its Impact on Japan: The Case of Japan's Racial Equality Proposal."  
Dr. Shusuke Takahara

Our speaker at the March meeting was a scholar from the Kansai, Dr. Shusuke Takahara, a researcher and lecturer at Doshisha University in Kyoto. His subject was "Wilsonian Idealism and its Impact on Japan -- The Case of Japan's Racial Equality Proposal ". On this occasion we were happy to have with us Mrs. Jacobs, the wife of the Dutch ambassador, who happened by chance to see the Bulletin among her husband's papers and found this was a subject of particular interest to her.

During World War I, said Dr. Takahara, Japan had taken over the Shantung Peninsula and the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands from Germany. She was anxious to keep these gains, but was afraid the Western powers might discriminate against her as the first non-white great power. Suspecting that Britain and America might form an Anglo-Saxon coalition against her, Japan put forward the Racial Equality Proposal at the Paris Peace Conference.

Japan had a direct and an indirect cause for being interested in racial equality. Directly, Japan was not enthusiastic about the establishment of the League of Nations, which was one of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points setting forth the basic principles for establishing a just and lasting peace, and undertook to draw up a counterplan. An indirect cause was related to the problem of finding a solution to the problem of Japanese immigration to the United States. Japan had already agreed by 1908 to prohibit immigration, but an anti-Japanese movement continued to grow in California, and, unlike his predecessors, Wilson was opposed to federal interference in state rights. For Japan, the inclusion of the Racial Equality Proposal in the Peace Treaty would achieve the double goal of solving the immigration problem and avoiding a racial clash between the whites and non-whites.

Wilson recognized the importance of the equal treatment of peoples, and hoped to embody this in the universal principles of the League's Covenant. However, as a southerner he was not in favour of the unqualified abolition of racial discrimination, being concerned that this might lead to internal disorder. At the same time he was not immune to the sense of the threat posed by the "yellow peril".

Support for Japan's Proposal also came, for different reasons, from Edward T. Williams, senior Far East specialist on the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Williams had lived in China for many years, and advocated overcoming white racial superiority, and at the same time he saw the pragmatic need to reach an agreement with Japan. He recommended agreeing to the Proposal, so that by making concessions to Japanese pride of race America would be entitled to ask Japan to be conciliatory to China in Shantung. But he saw this as a separate matter from the problem of Japanese immigration, arguing that just as Japan excluded Chinese labourers, so America should be permitted to exclude Japanese labourers.

A third person directly involved was Colonel House, who had discussions with two members of the Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, former Foreign Minister Makino Nobuaki and Ambassador to Britain Chinda Sutemi. Recognizing that Westerners were prejudiced against one another as well as against Eastern peoples, House suggested preparing two resolutions, one stating Japan's actual desires (Proposal A) and the other, the minimum they would accept (Proposal B). These were drafted, and House felt that Wilson would approve Proposal B, with a certain revision made to the language.

In the end, however, the clause embodying the equal treatment of peoples was struck from the draft of the Covenant. Even before Japan had prepared Proposals A and B, the United States had already acceded to British demands not to include any provisions about racial equality. The reason for Britain's opposition to Japan's proposal was that it was opposed by Australia, one of the British Dominions. Nevertheless, on the basis of Japan's revised Proposal B, Colonel House had discussions with the U.S. legal adviser, David H. Miller, and British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour. But Balfour would not budge, and Miller contended that the Racial Equality Proposal had no legal effect.

Finding their way blocked in this quarter, Makino and Chinda decided to submit a resolution for racial equality to the League of Nations Commission, hoping to have this incorporated in the article on religious freedom (Article 21). However, Article 21 was eventually dropped altogether because of opposition from the majority of the Commission.

Japan also directed its efforts further afield. The Ambassador to the United States, Ishii Kikujiro, devoted himself to trying to get both the administration and the general public to understand the need for the racial equality clause. A speech he made to the Japan Society in New York was well received, but at the same time it stirred up anti-Japanese feeling. Feeling that any show of sympathy with Japan's Proposal would bring the whole concept of the League under attack from anti-Japanese groups in America, Wilson was forced to change his views on the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the Covenant, to make it acceptable to domestic demands.

The Japanese representatives at the Peace Conference also sought to overcome the opposition there, which was led by Australia. Makino and Chinda talked with Australian Prime minister William Hughes, who argued that Japan should certainly be treated as an equal, and was already internationally respected, but that there were differences between Japan and Australia, and the two countries should not interfere in each other's domestic affairs. In this he was influenced by the need to maintain his power base, which depended on the support of the working class, which was imbued with the spirit of "White Australia".

To meet Australia's objections, the Japanese representatives decided to change the proposal to one for the "equality of nations", but this still did not meet with Australia's approval. The amended proposal was further revised, and, in an unusual gesture, the Japanese were invited to a conference of the British Dominions where the other representatives tried to persuade Hughes, but to no avail.

Japan's last hope was to get the phrase "equality of nations" included in the preamble to the League Covenant. A note was taken on this proposal at the last meeting of the League of Nations Commission, and 11 of the 17 members voted in favour of it, while six abstained. Up to that time, every issue had been resolved by a majority decision. However, Wilson wanted to avoid discussing the proposal at the plenary session, and declared that the amendment could not be adopted because it had not received unanimous approval. The Japanese decided they could not risk putting the amendment to the vote at the plenary session, and their last move was for Makino to make a speech there emphasizing the importance of the Racial Equality Proposal and stating that Japan would in the future continue to insist on the adoption of this principle by the League. In the end, the Racial Equality Proposal got no further than being included in the records of the plenary session.

In conclusion, Dr. Takahara summed up the reasons leading up to the defeat of the proposal. Wilson had decided against it because, firstly, it might affect the domestic political situation in the United States; secondly, it might hinder the establishment of the League of Nations if Britain was antagonized; and thirdly, he himself was not necessarily strongly in favour of it. Tragically, the opportunity was missed of developing a common policy between Japan and the United States based on a universal ideal. The Racial Equality Proposal issue became a measure of the level of Western commitment to liberal democracy, and ultimately one must conclude that it was submitted and rejected under the international and social limits of the time.

After a brief question period, the meeting closed with a vote of thanks proposed by Dr. Robert Eldridge, who recalled the days when he and Dr. Takahara had been classmates at Kobe University under Prof. Iokibe Makoto in 1994.  He complimented Dr. Takahara on continuing to work for his master's degree although he had been hard hit by the earthquake in the following year.  He was now recognized as an authority on his subject in America, having read papers at such events as the Woodrow Wilson National Symposium.